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Trust Us…We’re the FBI
Benjamin Shimp

Ben is a junior majoring in criminal justice.
This paper was written as part of a criminal
justice course he took in Fall 2007 under
the instruction of Prof. Richard Wright. At
this point in his academic career, he is still
deciding on a career path but enjoys the
study of American civil liberties.

O

n September 11, 2001, the United States of America was attacked
by terrorist operatives causing one of the worst acts of terrorism
known to date. In an effort to prevent these types of occurrences
from happening in our country, the Uniting and Strengthening of
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act was passed by Congress in October of 2001.
Since then many wiretap and surveillance programs have been put into place,
and many older provisions such as the National Security Letter have gained
strength. However, along with increased safety efforts many liberties and
freedoms afforded to Americans have been restricted and compromised as a
result.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a National Security
Letter (NSL) is a letter requesting “…information from a third party that is
issued by the FBI or by other government agencies with authority to conduct
national security investigations” (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], n.d.).
The authority of the NSL is provided by five provisions of the United States
Code. First, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), allows
NSLs to obtain financial institution customer records (FBI, n.d.). Second, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(a) and (b), permits disclosure on a
list of financial institution identities and consumer identifying information from
a credit reporting company (FBI, n.d.). Third, amendments to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, (under the USA PATRIOT Act) allow disclosure
of a full credit report on individuals believed to be involved in an international
terrorism case (FBI, n.d.). Fourth, the Electronics Communications Privacy
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, provides billing and transactional communication service
providers records from telephone companies and internet service providers (FBI,
n.d.). And finally, the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 436, obtains financial,
consumer, and travel records on certain government employees who have
access to classified information (FBI, n.d.). In simple terms, NSLs allow the FBI
and other government agencies to gather personal financial and transactional
information on residents in the United States.
Historically, NSLs were only used on foreign residents residing in America. Since
9/11 and the subsequent USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush’s administration
transformed NSLs essentially permitting disclosure of records on any United
States resident (foreign or domestic) (Gellman, 2005; Johnston & Lipton, 2007).
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While this may seem harsh, it has become one of the primary
methods of gathering intelligence information to generate
possible links to terrorism and terrorist plots. A method such
as this proactive approach was scrutinized because of criticisms
that the FBI received from being unable to prevent the terrorist
attacks in 2001 (Gellman, 2005; Washington Post, 2006). Thus,
the Bush administration and the FBI believed the NSL was
necessary to obstruct terrorism.
According to the FBI (n.d.), there are only two restrictions or
limitations placed on NSLs. First, they are only available for
authorized national security investigations (i.e., international
terrorism
or
foreign
intelligence/counter-intelligence
investigations), not general criminal investigations or domestic
terrorism investigations (FBI, n.d.). And second, an NSL can only
be used to seek transactional information permitted under the
five NSL provisions (FBI, n.d.).
A NSL cannot be used to acquire content within the transaction,
only the information that the transaction exists. For example,
a NSL cannot be used to authorize eavesdropping on telephone
communications or reading the contents of an e-mail. But it
allows government agencies to trace the paths of communication
between the telephone calls and the e-mails. Essentially, the
government can obtain records on how a person makes and
spends money, what he/she buys, where he/she travels, what he/
she reads on the Internet, who telephones or e-mails him/her at
home or at work, etc. The letters have typically been used to
trace the financial transactions of military personnel, but have
also largely been used to investigate civilian contractors as well
(Lichtblau & Mazzetti, 2007).
While the NSL seems like a viable method in catching terrorists
and disrupting planned operations, it is not a practical use of
resources, and it violates the First and Fourth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution which guarantees citizens rights and freedoms
in the United States. Therefore, a citizen, whether foreign or
domestic, who is within the United States should not be required
to turn over any documentation if he/she is a recipient of a NSL.
Under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, “The right of
the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”
(The National Archives, n.d.). The NSL is much like a warrant or
subpoena seeking particular information (such as bank statements,
telephone records, etc.), but it fails to support the provisions of
probable cause. When the NSL was created in 1986 as part of
the Electronics Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, it
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was utilized as an investigative tool to monitor for terrorism and
terrorist activity. However, because of the attack on the World
Trade Center in 2001, it is being used more loosely as a fishing
tool to acquire as much information as possible on thousands
of innocent people simply because they use a specific Internet
Service Provider or a certain telephone company (Savage, 2007).
According to the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General
(OIG), an underestimated 143,000 NSLs were issued between
2003 and 2005, and annually there has been a fivefold increase in
letters since 2001 (Fine, 2007; Smith, 2007). Staggering numbers
such as these show ‘hunches’ rather than probable cause, because
it is not probable that there is an excess of 143,000 United States
citizens who wish to commit an act of terrorism.
Before the USA PATRIOT Act, an NSL could only be used if it
had “specific and articulable facts [(e.g. probable cause)] giving
reason to believe that the customer or entity whose records are
sought [was] a foreign power or agent of a foreign power” (Fine,
2007). However, after the USA PATRIOT Act this requirement
was amended allowing NSLs to obtain information on any person
so long as it is relevant to a national security investigation (Fine,
2007; Lichtblau & Mazzetti, 2007). The amended requirement is
so broad that the FBI can construe practically anything as being
a national security investigation, which makes the NSL limitless.
Also, after the USA PATRIOT Act, issuance of NSLs was
broadened. Previously, NSLs were issued by a limited number
of senior FBI Headquarters officials, but new provisions allowed
Special Agents in Charge of the FBI’s 56 field offices to sign and
approve NSLs for use, greatly expanding approval authority (Fine,
2007).
Furthermore, according to its own provisions, the NSL is not
“supported by oath or affirmation,” rather it is issued by FBI
personnel without judicial oversight (The National Archives,
n.d.). This could cause significant abuses of power because of
inadequate checks and balances. In a report issued on March
28, 2007, Inspector General Glenn Fine testified that during the
period from 2003 to 2005 (3 years), out of 143,000 NSLs only 26
violations were found by the FBI.
The violations included “the issuance of NSLs without proper
authorization, improper requests under the statutes cited in the
NSLs, and unauthorized collection of telephone or Internet e-mail
transactional records” (Fine, 2007). Unfortunately, in the OIG’s
review of only 293 NSLs, 22 violations had not been reported
or identified by the FBI (Fine, 2007). This is very unsettling
because OIG found 22 violations out of 293 NSLs whereas the
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FBI reports 26 violations out of an excess of 143,000 NSLs. But
while these violations found by the OIG were believed to have
been a result from FBI agents’ confusion and unfamiliarity with
NSL constraints and not abuse, many, if not all of the violations
would not have occurred if judicial oversight existed in approving
an NSL.
Additionally, this report found problems under the Fourth
Amendment with “exigent letters,” or letters that request
information immediately because of emergency circumstances.
These letters were not part of the NSL authority and were not
NSLs. However, they were used to obtain subscriber information
from three telephone companies whose impression was that the
FBI had NSLs being constructed for them (which was true).
The NSL, however, would not arrive until months later because
the FBI needed to “cover” itself from being able to explain how
intelligence information was obtained legally (Fine, 2007). Often,
it was found that these exigent letters were authorized and signed
by FBI personnel who were not authorized to sign NSLs, making
them non-legal binding documents. And according to OIG, their
review found that many times the “exigent letters” were used in
non-emergency situations to begin with (Fine, 2007).
Under the First Amendment in our Constitution, people are
guaranteed that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press” (The National Archives, n.d.).
Within the provisions of a NSL there is a clause that places a gag
order on the letter, prohibiting its re,cipient from ever speaking
about it (18 U.S.C. 2709(c) [2006]). Original provisions to the
NSL prohibited its recipients from challenging the letter in
court. However, after the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 3511 (2006), amendments
to judicial review were inserted into the USA PATRIOT Act
allowing the United States district courts to “…petition for an
order modifying or setting aside the request” (18 U.S.C § 3511
[2006]). This decision came after the 2004 case of John Doe
versus John Ashcroft (Marrero, 2007).
In this particular case, John Doe, an internet service provider,
received an NSL to disclose records from customers using their
services. After refusing, Doe challenged the letter claiming its
unconstitutionality under the gag order provision. In September
2004, Judge Victor Marrero struck down NSL provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act saying that permanent gag orders violated
free speech rights protected under the First Amendment. The
government appealed the ruling, but Congress amended the
NSL provision (through the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act) before the court could issue a decision
(American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2007). Essentially, had
Congress not passed the bill, the NSL would probably have been
declared unconstitutional, thus prohibiting its use.

However, the new provisions, which allow limited judicial review
(only challenging) are still unconstitutional. The NSL still violates
the First Amendment by “giving the FBI authority to suppress
speech without prior judicial review” (ACLU, 2007). While the
amended statute allows recipients to challenge gag orders in
district court, the NSL provision requires that the courts defer to
the FBI’s view that secrecy is necessary (ACLU, 2007). But, this
defeats the purpose of judicial review and checks and balances if
discretion is solely limited to the FBI.
While one can understand the expeditious process and speediness
of the NSL as a tool, it should not be utilized if it violates the First
and Fourth Amendments. There should be a balance between
civil liberties and investigative methods, however, the NSL does
not provide an adequate balance and draws supreme power to
the Executive branch. Rather, instead of using an NSL perhaps it
would be more prudent to use something similar to the original
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801
(2006), however, maintain the intelligence information that an
NSL obtains (i.e., transactional records rather that complete
surveillance as the FISA does). This way prior judicial consent
would be required in order to lawfully collect data on suspects.
Under FISA-like provisions, the courts must find probable cause
and minimization requirements to justify surveillance. Moreover,
problems with the First Amendment will cease to exist because
the FISA requires no gag order for its recipients. Overall,
some speediness may be lost, but even more is being lost when
companies refuse to hand over information because they believe
the request to be unconstitutional.
Thus far, the documents that have been collected through the
NSL have not found or established any links to terrorism or
terrorist related planning (Lichtblau & Mazzetti, 2007; Gellman,
2006). And on September 6, 2007, the gag order on the NSL was
declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment because
“it functions as a licensing scheme that does not afford adequate
procedural safeguards, and because it is not a sufficiently narrowly
tailored restriction on protected speech” (Marrero, 2007).
Because the courts determined that the subsection involving the
gag order could not be separated from the rest of the statute, the
entire NSL provision was declared unconstitutional barring an
appeal within 90 days (Marrero, 2007). This does not restrict
the FBI from using the NSL within the extra 90 days, however,
unless an appeal is filed the decision will uphold the statute as
unconstitutional.
While there is no doubt that an appeal will be filed or amendments
will be made to the existing NSL statute, one can only hope that
new provisions will give American citizens proper civil liberties
afforded by the U.S. Constitution. As the battle continues to stop
the War on Terrorism, we must not lose sight of maintaining
liberty and order by keeping our methods of intelligence gathering
fair and constitutional.
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